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Abstract 
Understanding the dynamics of dissent and heresy in 
medicine can be aided by use of suitable frameworks. The 
dynamics of the search for truth vary considerably 
depending on whether the search is competitive or 
cooperative and on whether truth is assumed to be unitary or 
plural. Insights about dissent and heresy in medicine can be 
gained by making comparisons to politics and religion. To 
explain adherence to either orthodoxy or a challenging view, 
partisans use a standard set of explanations; social scientists 
use these plus others, especially symmetrical analyses. 
There is a wide array of methods by which orthodoxy 
maintains its domination and marginalises challengers. 
Finally, challengers can adopt various strategies in order to 
gain a hearing. 
  
Keywords: Dissent; Heresy; Orthodoxy; Medical 
knowledge; Medical research; Strategies 
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Introduction 
The conventional view is that the human immunodeficiency 
virus, HIV, is responsible for AIDS. But for many years a 
few scientists have espoused the incompatible view that 
HIV is harmless and is not responsible for AIDS (Duesberg, 
1996; Maggiore, 1999). The issue came to world attention in 
2001 when South African President Thabo Mbeki invited a 
number of so-called HIV/AIDS dissidents to join an 
advisory panel. In response, more than 5000 scientists 
signed a statement affirming support for the standard view 
that HIV is the cause of AIDS. These events were unusual in 
their visibility: few challenges to medical orthodoxy receive 
such high-level media coverage. For example, the proposal 
that squatting for defecation is a means for preventing 
haemorrhoids has received little scientific attention, with 
most discussion being in the pages of alternative health 
magazines (Dimmer, Martin, Reeves & Sullivan, 1996). 
Furthermore, there are challenges to orthodoxy that cannot 
be found in the medical or any other literature, since their 
proponents are not able to get published. When it comes to 
orthodoxy and challenges to it, there is a tremendous 
variation in ideas, support, visibility and outcome. 
What is the best term for referring to a challenge to 
orthodoxy? Wolpe (1994) offers an illuminating typology of 
internal challenges. One type of challenge is to "knowledge 
products" such as disease prognoses that question current 
knowledge - namely, what are considered to be facts - while 
operating within conventional assumptions about scientific 
method. Wolpe calls this sort of challenge dissent and gives 
the examples of Peter Duesberg and, at the collective level, 
doctors practising homeopathy. A second type of challenge 
is to the profession's authority structure, without challenging 
knowledge systems or methods. Wolpe calls this rebellion 
and gives examples of doctors using untested AIDS 
therapies and women entering previously male-dominated 
medical domains. The third type of challenge is to the 
central values of the orthodoxy, including the very 
assumptions about how claims should be evaluated. Wolpe 
calls this heresy and gives the examples of Thomas Szasz's 
claim that mental illness is a myth and, at a collective level, 
the holistic health movement. Wolpe's useful classification 
of challenges into dissent, rebellion and heresy will be 
adopted here; the main focus will be on dissent and heresy. 
Wolpe (1994) notes that these forms of challenge are not 
always discrete. For example, some cases of dissent, such as 
Benveniste's finding that extremely dilute solutions can have 
biological activity (Davenas, Beauvais, Amara, Oberbaum, 
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Robinzon, Miadonna, et al., 1988), can turn into heresy, in 
this case by providing support to the heretical field of 
homeopathy. Another important distinction made by Wolpe 
(1994) is between heresy and reform, the later being a 
challenge couched in orthodox terminology and treated 
seriously by adherents of orthodoxy. Heresy is in effect 
created by the response of orthodoxy: by attacking certain 
views, those views become delineated as beyond the pale. 
Heresy and dissent can be said, then, to be socially 
constructed: their status as forms of ideological challenge is 
not inherent in knowledge claims but depends on the way 
they are treated by the orthodoxy. 
It is a simplification to talk of any particular type of dissent 
or heresy as if it constitutes a cohesive alternative. For 
example, the views of Peter Duesberg, by far the most 
prominent HIV/AIDS dissident, are often assumed to 
represent the views of all HIV/AIDS dissidents, but actually 
there is a considerable range of perspectives, not all 
compatible, including the view that there is no solid 
evidence that HIV even exists (Papadopulos-Eleopulos, 
1988), causing infighting within the dissident movement 
(http://www.virusmyth.net/aids/). Delving into any 
particular case study can lead to increasing complexities that 
seem to defy attempts at generalisation. Nevertheless, it can 
be useful to seek to discover regular patterns and to develop 
ways of explaining dissent and heresy. With the large 
qualification that the full complexity of actual cases can 
never be captured by any model, the task of this paper is to 
outline some frameworks for understanding the dynamics of 
dissent and heresy in medical theory and research 
There are several ways to proceed. One fruitful approach is 
to analyse case studies, which can reveal a wealth of insight. 
Another is to start with principles of good research and 
assumptions about the purpose of theory, looking for 
guidance about practical implementation. Here a somewhat 
different approach will be used. Various ways of explaining 
adherence to orthodoxy and dissent/heresy will be described 
from the characteristic viewpoints of partisans and social 
scientists, and various methods for domination and 
marginalisation will be outlined, which is basically an 
exercise in describing the operation of power. Then a 
number of strategies that challengers can adopt to gain a 
hearing will be presented. Focussing on methods and 
strategies is a pragmatic approach that does not seek to pass 
judgement on claims and counterclaims. 
But before examining methods and strategies, it is 
worthwhile stepping back a bit and asking, "Why should 
dissent and heresy exist?" 
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Models of the search for truth 
That dissent and heresy exist seems patently obvious, as 
examination of any number of cases testifies, from cancer to 
vaccination. Could it be otherwise? 
A wider picture can be grasped by looking at two 
assumptions: whether there is a single truth or a plurality of 
truths and whether the search for truth occurs by conflict or 
cooperation. This leads to four possibilities, as shown in 
Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1. A classification of modes of search for truth in 
terms of assumptions about cooperation/conflict and 
unity/plurality of truth. The four quadrants are labelled I 
through IV clockwise from upper right.  
  
Quadrant I assumes conflict over truth, assumed to be 
unitary. These conditions help account for the viciousness of 
many struggles, which are win-lose: if there is only one 
truth, then every other viewpoint must be wrong. Duesberg 
argues that HIV is neither necessary nor sufficient to cause 
AIDS, whereas the dominant view is that HIV is a necessary 
factor. Both sides believe that only side can be correct - 
namely, they assume a unitary truth about HIV's role - and, 
in practice, conflict is the primary mode by which the issue 
is engaged. 
If it is assumed instead that there are multiple truths (a 
standard postmodernist presumption), while retaining a 
conflict orientation, then we enter Quadrant II, in which the 
characteristic mode of interaction is competition, for 
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Unitary truth IV. 
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example in a "market of modalities." This model seems to 
fit some ailments such as back pain, in which different 
patients consult doctors, chiropractors, osteopaths, 
acupuncturists or others, without a general presumption that 
any single modality provides a universal answer. This model 
does not ideally fit any disease, since many practitioners 
continue to believe they have a special insight into the truth, 
but the increasing role of markets in health and medicine 
means that modalities compete with each other in a market 
in which claims to exclusive truth are less persuasive than in 
the past, with consumers' demands for "choice" fostering a 
tolerance for diverse truths (Gottlieb, 1997). 
Moving to Quadrant III, we enter a region where 
cooperation combines with an assumption of a plurality of 
truths. In this hypothetical world, researchers and 
practitioners would be happy to help each other develop 
greater insights on a range of perspectives. Imagine, for 
example, orthodox practitioners helping homeopaths to do 
better homeopathy, and vice versa! This would be a 
dramatic contrast to Quadrant I. This sort of cooperative 
tolerance can happen on an individual level, such as when a 
referee disagrees with an author's perspective but, rather 
than attacking it, offers insights on improving the argument 
within the author's framework. Cooperative tolerance may 
occur in some patient support groups, in which the goal of 
helping others takes precedence over epistemological 
differences. 
Finally, Quadrant IV describes the ideal world of scientific 
research, in which researchers cooperate in a search for 
truth. Although this is the model of research commonly 
portrayed in science textbooks and uncritical histories, it is 
far from what is usually found in the actual practice of 
science, which is marked by rivalries and power plays 
(Boffey, 1975; Dickson, 1984; Greenberg, 1967). Quadrant 
IV is the model that seems to explain research when there 
are no challengers. Within a paradigm, many researchers 
cooperate to solve puzzles. On many issues in medicine 
there is no disagreement, for example concerning whether it 
is wise to stem massive loss of blood. Because cooperation 
is much less dramatic than conflict, there is a tendency to 
focus on conflict as the norm. Actually, conflict can only 
thrive on a foundation of agreement about many other 
matters. 
The four quadrants in Figure 1 represent ideal types: 
knowledge systems and interactions between them seldom 
fit nicely within a single quadrant. A medical controversy 
might begin mainly in one quadrant and proceed through 
others, while exhibiting some elements of all four at any 
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given time. For example, in the debate over the causes of 
schizophrenia, competition between various biomedical 
explanations could be said to fall within Quadrant IV 
(though with some competitive elements), while alternative 
models - the myth-of-mental-illness model and the mystical 
model - are heresies with respect to the overall biomedical 
orthodoxy, with the dynamics fitting squarely into Quadrant 
I (Gosden, 2001). Another example is acupuncture, whose 
challenge to biomedicine would normally sit in Quadrant I. 
However, medical practitioners who use acupuncture and 
redefine it in biomedical terms move the dynamics towards 
Quadrants II or IV (Dew, 2000a). 
Perspective on dissent and heresy in medicine can be gained 
by making comparisons with politics and religion. First 
consider politics. In the Quadrant I political perspective, 
states claim a monopoly on political truth, treat opponents as 
heretics and crush them by any means possible. Examples 
are state repression and totalitarianism. In Quadrant II, 
conflict is moderated by a recognition that truth is not 
unitary, as when political parties compete electorally. (This 
may occur within the context of a shared assumption about 
certain political truths, such as that governments cannot 
tolerate nonparty challenges, for example from workers.) An 
example fitting with Quadrant III is the canton system, 
which in principle allows local populations to adopt 
different political systems within an overall framework of 
cooperation, as found in Switzerland and was proposed, in 
more radical form, for South Africa (Kendall & Louw, 
1987). Finally, examples fitting Quadrant IV include 
consensus (also called unitary democracy), such as in small 
cooperatives, and - to use a very different case - so-called 
"democratic centralism," in which a political party elite 
agrees on a unified "line," as is typical of Leninist parties. 
As in the case of medicine, the four "political quadrants" are 
ideal types, with actual political systems exhibiting some 
elements of all four types, with different weights at different 
times. 
What can be learned from this comparison between models 
of medicine and politics? One point is that no particular 
model (i.e., quadrant) is necessarily good or bad. In politics, 
systems based on conflict and on cooperation - typified by 
voting and consensus, respectively - each have strengths and 
weaknesses as democratic forms (Mansbridge, 1980). 
Quadrant I includes totalitarianism, with repression of all 
dissent - including scientific dissent (Popovsky, 1980) - but 
can also describe one face of a generally tolerant society, 
namely when the government uses repression against those 
labelled as traitors or terrorists. Nonetheless, the social costs 
of operating in Quadrant I are considerable. In politics, 
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repression of challengers, however justifiable, commonly 
results in a reduction in civil liberties, so by analogy we 
might expect that attacks on medical dissidents are likely to 
inhibit open expression in medical research. Certainly there 
is evidence that workers in many occupations are afraid to 
challenge the status quo, for example in environmental 
science (Wilson & Barnes, 1995) and government 
employment (Zipparo, 1999). 
Another important point is that there are alternatives to the 
model of orthodoxy versus dissent/heresy. In the heat of 
battle, the existence of alternatives is often forgotten. 
Next consider religion or, perhaps more accurately, religious 
establishments. The Quadrant I perspective on religion fits 
what might be described as "intolerant monopolising 
religions," namely those that consider they are holders of the 
one and only truth and that those who do not agree are 
heretics. Examples are Christianity and Islam during long 
periods of their history. Proponents of other religions can 
come under attack, but special enmity is reserved for 
insiders who deviate from orthodoxy: these heretics are the 
most feared and reviled (Kurtz, 1983, 1986). 
In Quadrant II, religious hatreds are greatly reduced. Rather 
than seeking to impose a monopoly on religious truth, there 
is a competition for allegiance. This describes relations 
between churches in many contemporary societies with 
secular governments. It also applies to denominations within 
some religions, such as different Protestant churches. 
Quadrant III fits those liberal-minded or free-thinking 
individuals who are found both within some religions and 
outside of organised religion altogether, who seek spiritual 
truths wherever they can find them, and encourage others to 
find their own truths, using the resources of each religious 
tradition to maximum effect. Cooperative tolerance also 
describes some spiritual traditions such as Zen Buddhism. 
Finally, in Quadrant IV might fit some aspects of 
ecumenical movements that see different religions as all 
speaking about the same thing, but in different languages, an 
approach not greatly dissimilar to Quadrant III. 
As before, the four religious quadrants are ideal types that 
do not capture the messiness of reality. For example, leaders 
of many churches may believe they have special access to 
the truth but in practice engage in market-style competition 
for allegiance because they do not have the power to impose 
their views on others. 
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These models of religion offer some insights concerning 
medicine. The orthodoxy-heresy model of religion applies 
most obviously when a religious establishment has a great 
deal of political and social power that is linked to hegemony 
in the realm of ideas. For example, during the Middle Ages 
in Europe, the Catholic Church had enormous economic 
resources of its own, strong ties to monarchs and a 
monopoly over education, as well as crucial ideological 
control. In most parts of the world today, no church has 
anything like this degree of power, so there is greater 
emphasis on market competition or a more cooperative 
approach. However, in militant theocracies, such as Iran and 
Afghanistan when crusading religious elites have controlled 
the state, the orthodoxy-heresy model fits very well. 
Another point is that whereas differences in beliefs can be 
extremely threatening to an establishment, in a more 
cooperative environment, these differences become 
opportunities for learning. In other words, no belief is 
heretical in itself. What makes it heresy is the attitude of the 
dominant group. (This also applies to political beliefs.) In 
short, it can be said that dissent and heresy are created by 
attempts to create or maintain hegemony. 
Finally, challenges from the inside - heresy and dissent - are 
far more threatening to an establishment than outside 
challenges. This is true of all establishments, not least 
medicine (Dew, 1997; Wolpe, 1990). 
  
Models for explaining 
adherence to orthodoxy and 
dissent/heresy 
In the remainder of this paper, the focus will be on medicine 
as described by Quadrant I, namely arenas in which 
competition over an assumed unitary truth leads to the 
dynamics of orthodoxy and dissent/heresy. Within this 
model, a key question is how to explain adherence to either 
medical orthodoxy or a challenging view. Partisans typically 
explain their own views as being based on fact, logic and 
sound scientific procedure, in short arguing that truth is on 
their side. What is more interesting is how they explain 
others' support for some different position. It is useful to 
outline four explanations frequently articulated by partisans 
in disputes. 
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Table 1. Common explanations by partisans for others' 
adherence to contrary beliefs 
1. Wrong ideas 
2. Personal prejudice; unscientific behaviour 
3. Paradigm-boundedness 
4. Vested interests 
  
Explanation 1 is that the other side is wrong in terms of 
facts, arguments and theories. For example, the medical 
establishment claims that homeopathy is impossible since, 
after sufficient dilutions, there is no physical mechanism by 
which homeopathic medicines can cause any biological 
effect. From the viewpoint of orthodox medicine, then, 
homeopathy is rightly marginal, because it is based on 
wrong ideas, and the orthodox view is dominant because it 
is scientifically correct or at least founded on sound 
scientific principles. 
Advocates of homeopathy, on the other hand, believe that 
medical orthodoxy is wrong. (Indeed, on investigating any 
medical controversy, it is striking how fiercely each side 
believes in its own validity and the other side's error.) But 
this provides no way of explaining why the orthodoxy is 
dominant, so homeopathists must seek some other 
explanation for this. 
Explanation 2 says that adherence to scientific beliefs is 
based, in part, on scientists' personal prejudice. Although the 
standard picture is that scientists deal with facts and logic 
neutrally and unemotionally, in short objectively, there is 
quite a lot of evidence that personal commitment, rivalry, 
spite and other emotional drives affect scientific beliefs 
(Mahoney, 1976; Mitroff, 1974; Watson, 1938). One need 
only observe scientists in action to accept the role of 
prejudice and "unscientific" behaviours. In a controversy, 
this explanation is commonly applied by each side to the 
other. Defenders of orthodoxy attribute dissent and heresy to 
the psychological shortcomings of challengers: they have 
grasped onto a bad idea and only stick with it because of 
emotional commitments, rather than behaving scientifically. 
Similarly, challengers explain adherence to orthodoxy by 
the prejudice of establishment scientists. 
Explanation 3 is based on the idea of a scientific paradigm, 
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proposed by Kuhn (1970) and elaborated and modified by 
others (Barnes, 1982; Fuller, 2000; Lakatos & Musgrave, 
1970). A paradigm is a unified set of ideas and practices that 
shapes scientific research in an area. This explanation does 
not require any individual bias. The bias, in the form of 
foundational assumptions, is built into the framework 
underlying thinking and research in the area. Explanation 3 
is commonly used by heretics to explain the resistance by 
orthodox practitioners to any idea outside their standard 
framework. Citing the well-known resistance to 
Copernicanism, evolutionary biology and quantum physics, 
heretics tie their own beliefs to a glorious tradition of 
paradigm challenges. Within medicine, there are many 
examples of challenges that later became orthodoxy (Stern, 
1941), most famously Semmelweis's advocacy of sterile 
conditions in maternity wards. Resistance to new ideas can 
be interpreted as deriving from a commitment to a well-
developed framework of ideas and an associated set of 
practices. Using Wolpe's (1994) distinction, it can be said 
that heretics challenge the reigning paradigm whereas 
dissidents challenge only some elements within the 
paradigm. 
Defenders of orthodoxy are less likely to attribute heresy to 
paradigm-boundedness, but when they do, it is on the basis 
that the current paradigm is correct and that the challenging 
paradigm is wrong. After all, paradigms have proved highly 
successful in guiding research, and most challengers turn 
out to be wrong. Western medical researchers might 
acknowledge that acupuncture is based on a completely 
different theory of body dynamics but simply reject the 
alternative theory as baseless even if the procedure is 
sometimes effective. 
Explanation 4 attributes support for ideas to the role of 
interests such as money, power and fame. For example, a 
scientist may obtain, or hope to obtain, research funding 
from aluminium companies to investigate Alzheimer's 
disease, and hence have a preference for all theories aside 
from the role of aluminium in the disease. A high-level 
medical administrator and adviser may have a lot of power 
as long as little criticism is made of the role of government 
policy in focussing on medical treatment rather than 
environmental prevention. An orthodox researcher's 
substantial reputation might be jeopardised by openly 
supporting a "fringe" position such as megavitamin therapy. 
When an interest is well established such as through law, 
economic power or custom, it is commonly called a vested 
interest. A researcher can have an interest in getting a 
particular paper published, but this interest is typically 
fleeting and limited compared to the vested interest of a 
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pharmaceutical company in drug sales and hence in 
manipulating testing and influencing government 
regulations (Abraham, 1995). 
Given the massive role of government and corporate 
funding in medical research, it is not hard to perceive the 
role of political and economic interests. For example, it is 
common for researchers to be paid by pharmaceutical 
companies to test proprietary drugs. Sometimes researchers 
stand to gain large amounts of money by supporting a 
corporate line, most notoriously in the case of scientists who 
testify on behalf of tobacco companies. For many research 
scientists, though, fame is a more powerful lure. Nobel 
prizes are seldom awarded to advocates of fringe therapies. 
Challengers can become adept at explaining adherence to 
orthodoxy by the role of vested interests. For example, it 
might seem that dentists have little to gain from fluoridation, 
since it is intended to reduce tooth decay in children. 
Opponents of fluoridation, though, point to several pro-
fluoridation vested interests, including the careers of leading 
pro-fluoridation researchers, the dental profession's 
improved image by being associated with a scientifically 
sophisticated intervention, the aluminium industry's 
economic stake in having its fluoride waste seen as a 
nutrient rather than a pollutant, and advantages to the sugary 
food industry in diverting attention away from the role of 
sugar in tooth decay (Martin, 1991). Proponents of 
orthodoxy can also invoke vested interests in explaining 
opposition. For example, supporters of fluoridation have 
pointed to the role of right-wing political organisations, 
religious groups and health-food businesses as having 
something to gain from opposing fluoridation (though more 
commonly proponents rely on explanations 1 and 2). 
If partisans deploy explanations 1 to 4 to explain others' 
positions, what about social scientists? Figure 2 divides up 
"explanatory space" in two ways. First is whether the focus 
is on knowledge, actors (namely the participants in the 
dispute) or social structures (such as capitalism and 
patriarchy). Second is whether the analysis treats the 
contending knowledge claims, partisans and social 
structures with the same conceptual tools. 
  




Knowledge vi. Positivism i. Sociology of 
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Figure 2. Classification of some social science approaches 
to studying orthodoxy and marginality.  
  
The frameworks in Figure 2 are ideal types. Actual analyses 
commonly combine elements of two or more of the 
approaches, especially in looking at both epistemological 
and political dimensions of a controversy, namely both 
knowledge and actors/structures. 
In the asymmetrical approaches, the assumption is that one 
side is "right" scientifically and/or politically, so that the 
main task of the social scientist is to explain deviation from 
the correct view. The positivist approach (box vi) typically 
involves the social scientist deciding what is scientifically 
correct, often by determining the view of establishment 
scientists. Adherence to this view, which is usually the 
orthodoxy, is not considered to require sociological 
explanation. The task then becomes to explain why some 
people support contrary views. Psychological and social 
factors can be used, such as ignorance, prejudice, fear, 
confusion or any number of other variables, which can be 
classified as forms of social dysfunction (box v). The 
essence of the typical asymmetrical approach is that social 
explanations are required only of those who deviate from 
orthodoxy. To use a medical analogy, explanations are 
sought for pathology but not good health. This can be 
illustrated in Figure 3. 
  
knowledge 
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Figure 3. Types of social explanations for orthodoxy and 
marginality sought using an asymmetrical approach, as a 
function of whether the science is considered good and 
whether it is favourably received.  
  
The asymmetrical approach involves seeking social 
explanations for Quadrants I and III, where bad science is 
favourably received or good science is unfavourably 
received, but requires no explanation for Quadrants II and 
IV. 
Social structural approaches switch focus from actors, 
characteristic of social dysfunction or group politics, to 
social structures such as class, gender, ethnicity, the state, 
bureaucracy and profession. A social structural approach to 
chiropractic might focus, for example, on the role of the 
state in creating a monopoly for conventional medicine. 
Analyses that focus on the shaping of medical knowledge 
and politics by capitalism often fit into the category of 
asymmetrical social structural analyses (box iv), since only 
the deformations of establishment knowledge are examined, 
not those of knowledge linked to the working class; those 
analyses that treat Marxism as "scientific" also draw on a 
type of social science positivism. Pure structural analyses 
are relatively rare, since to get at the nitty-gritty of 
controversies it is necessary to examine actions as well as 
structures. 
The symmetrical approach, by contrast, seeks social 
explanations for all beliefs, whether they are considered 
correct or incorrect by scientists (Barnes, 1974; Bloor, 1976; 
Fleck, 1979; Mulkay, 1979; Wallis, 1979). This is illustrated 
in Figure 4, where more neutral terms are used instead of 
"bias" and "vested interests." 
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Figure 4. Types of social explanations for orthodoxy and 
marginality sought using a symmetrical approach, as a 
function of whether the science is considered good and 
whether it is favourably received.  
  
Unlike asymmetrical approaches, which are based on a 
dichotomy between scientific and social explanations 
(so that a social explanation is assumed to be 
"unscientific"), a sociology-of-knowledge approach 
(box i) does not pass judgement on scientific validity 
and says that a social explanation can be compatible 
with scientific validity. The sociology of medical 
knowledge, unlike positivism, involves social 
explanations for medical orthodoxy (Figlio, 1978; 
Gubrium, 1987; Wright & Treacher, 1982). 
The group politics approach (box ii) involves analysing 
the actions of various groups in the controversy, such 
as via public statements, meetings, fund-raising and 
law-making. For example, a group politics approach to 
chiropractic would look at actions by chiropractor 
organisations, doctor associations, governments and 
patient groups, for example in organising training, 
credentials, research, licensing and medical insurance 
coverage. A purely symmetrical group politics 
approach uses the same conceptual tools to examine 
groups on both sides of any conflict. Studies drawing 
on resource mobilisation theory or political process 
theory can be pursued symmetrically, though in 
practice analysts often focus on actions by challenging 
actors, thus fitting more into box v. 
An example of constructivist analysis at the structural 
level (box iii) might be an examination of the influence 
of organisational cultures on knowledge production 
both within conventional research institutes and 
within groups that undertake research into challenging 
paradigms. There appears to be little work that fits into 
this category. 
Although the sociology of knowledge places the analyst 
in a position of being formally neutral with respect to 
knowledge claims by participants, in practice it may be 
impossible for social scientists to remain separate from 
the controversies they study, at least in the case of 
ongoing controversies. Some analysts are open or 
covert partisans. Even when social scientists are 
personally indifferent to the issues and claimants, their 
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writings and comments can be used by partisans to 
advance a particular side to the dispute (Scott, 
Richards & Martin, 1990). Furthermore, the choice of a 
framework of analysis and the choice of an issue to 
study contribute to a "de facto partisanship" by the 
analyst (Bammer & Martin, 1992). Thus, the issue of 
symmetry versus asymmetry is far more complex than 
it might appear on the surface. 
The classification in Figure 2 assumes a snapshot of an 
issue, but changes occur over time. Many studies of 
scientific controversies have paid attention to 
"closure," namely the ending of a dispute (Engelhardt 
& Caplan, 1987). This has an epistemological 
dimension, namely the reaching of scientific 
agreement, as well as social and political dimensions. 
Orthodoxy may be able to defeat a direct challenge; if 
the losers continue their efforts by establishing a 
separate research programme, this can be called 
heterodox science, a description that might fit the 
HIV/AIDS dissidents in recent years. This could also 
be seen as a move from Quadrant I to Quadrant II in 
Figure 1. 
Given this highly abbreviated overview of explanations 
for orthodoxy and dissent/heresy, it is possible to 
compare the typical explanations by partisans and 
social scientists. A fair generalisation is that virtually 
all partisans are positivists: they explain their own 
positions as being based on science and seek to provide 
social explanations for their opponents' positions. 
Partisans also draw on asymmetrical actor-oriented 
and occasionally structural analyses to explain the 
dynamics of dissent and heresy. Thus, the most 
distinctive approaches used by social scientists but 
almost never by partisans are the symmetrical ones, 
which seek to explain all knowledge claims and 
examine all social action using the same conceptual 
tools. Note that a rudimentary sociology-of-knowledge 
analysis can be artificially composed by combining the 
positions of partisans from both sides of a dispute, for 
example drawing on the attributions of interest made 
by each side of the fluoridation controversy about the 
other: such attributions are valuable guides for any 
social scientist studying the role of interests in a 
controversy. 
Figure 2 presents six ideal-type social science 
approaches to studying orthodoxy and marginality as if 
the researcher can simply choose whichever one seems 
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most fruitful or congenial. In practice, though, many 
scholars are committed to particular approaches, 
sometimes so much so that it is hard to recognise that 
other approaches could be valid. Consider, for 
example, Linus Pauling's claim that vitamin C in large 
doses can cure cancer. A positivist would say that the 
reason that megadoses of vitamin C has been rejected 
as a cancer therapy is simply that the evidence has not 
been anywhere strong enough. Richards (1991), who 
adopts a symmetrical analysis, argues that Pauling's 
work was marginalised through social and political 
means, not by disinterested, rational processes; for 
example, in the trials of vitamin C carried out by the 
Mayo Clinic, Pauling's clinical and evaluative 
framework was not used, thereby prejudicing the 
result. The choice of a social science approach affects 
not just the form of analysis but also the choice of what 
to study. As indicated in Figure 3, those using an 
asymmetrical approach are unlikely to feel the need to 
explain either the ready acceptance of chemotherapy 
(quadrant IV) or the rejection of vitamin C (quadrant 
II). In contrast, Richards (1991) examines both the 
wide acceptance and use of cytotoxic drug 5-
fluorouracil in treating cancer - despite it never having 
been proven effective through double-blind trials - as 
well as the rejection of vitamin C, using the same 
analytical tools, as in Figure 4. 
  
Methods of domination and 
marginalisation 
To focus on methods of domination and 
marginalisation is to narrow the focus yet further, 
away from epistemological issues to the role of 
interests. In terms of partisans' explanations, 
domination and marginalisation result from vested 
interests and paradigms. In terms of social scientists' 
explanations, domination and marginalisation result 
from asymmetries in social structure or from 
inequalities in the power of relevant groups, both of 
which are compatible with a constructivist framework. 
Table 2 lists some of the prime methods for 
domination or hegemony, or in other words 
maintaining an orthodoxy. 
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Table 2. Some methods of domination in medical 
research 
• State power 
• Training 
• Restriction on entry 
• Career opportunities 
• Research resources 
• Editorial control 
• Incentives 
• Belief system 
• Peer pressure 
  
These methods can be illustrated by the case of the 
dominance of conventional treatments for cancer, 
namely surgery, radiotherapy and chemotherapy, 
supplemented by diagnostic testing (Hess, 1997, 2000; 
Moss, 1996; Proctor, 1995). 
The state exercises power over medical treatment in a 
number of ways, including licensing of doctors (with 
associated banning of certain procedures by 
unlicensed practitioners), health insurance systems, 
and legal restraints. For example, only licensed doctors 
are allowed to carry out surgery; government health 
insurance schemes cover conventional treatments but 
not alternatives; and laws and regulations prevent 
some substances being used for cancer treatment, such 
as marijuana for pain relief. 
Training to become a doctor is a process of 
enculturation and indoctrination. The heavy work-load 
of memorisation and intensive practical work 
discourages independent thinking. Future doctors and 
medical researchers are taught all about surgery, 
radiotherapy and chemotherapy, assumed to be the 
appropriate treatments, but seldom anything positive 
about nonstandard approaches. 
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Examinations provide a screening process that 
encourages orthodoxy. For those who pursue a 
research path through the PhD, the process of writing 
a thesis or dissertation further weeds out those who 
might challenge orthodoxy (Schmidt, 2000). Those 
who spend their time investigating unorthodox ideas 
about cancer will be less prepared to pass 
examinations and likely to have a much greater 
difficulty gaining their credential, especially if it is at a 
mainstream institution. 
Career opportunities include jobs, good salaries, high 
status and some positions of power and influence in 
advisory or decision-making bodies. These are 
available to supporters of orthodoxy but almost never 
to challengers. Some dissidents and even fewer 
heretics may slip through the training and 
credentialing system, but then there are few desirable 
career paths. 
Research resources include jobs with attached research 
facilities, plus grant systems. In the cancer field, these 
are overwhelmingly allocated to supporters of 
orthodox approaches, with a margin of innovation 
allowed. 
Editorial power is involved in setting up journals, 
accepting papers and running advertisements. 
Mainstream medical journals deal largely with 
conventional cancer therapies and publish ads linked 
to these. Articles supporting alternative therapies 
seldom can get past editors and referees at mainstream 
journals and seldom are backed by companies able to 
pay for major ads. 
The category "incentives" covers a variety of 
encouragements for adherence to orthodoxy, including 
prizes as well as payments from companies, for 
example to attend conferences, provide testimony or 
recommend certain drugs. 
"Belief system" refers to the domination of a set of 
ideas, such as that a particular theory is scientifically 
correct, ethically proper or socially appropriate. When 
cancer researchers simply assume, in choosing 
research projects, that the biomedical model and 
conventional therapies are the best way to proceed, it 
can be said that the conventional cancer belief system 
is hegemonic. 
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Finally, peer pressure is the influence of co-workers, 
friends and respected figures in the profession. When 
everyone else believes and acts according to a single 
perspective, it can be extremely difficult to pursue a 
contrary path. In the cancer field, accepting or at least 
not criticising orthodox approaches is usually 
necessary in order to maintain the respect of peers. 
Other methods can be added to the list, depending on 
the issue. In some cases, patient groups provide 
support for orthodoxy, for example when cancer 
support groups raise funds for radiotherapy units. On 
some issues that have popular appeal, the mass media 
contribute to domination, such as when they report 
uncritical accounts of cancer "breakthroughs," always 
in the mould of the biomedical model. The aim here is 
not to provide an exhaustive list but to indicate some 
of the more important methods. 
The different methods of domination interact with 
each other, most commonly by mutual reinforcement. 
For example, when medical school teachers hold to the 
conventional cancer belief system, they encourage 
students to adopt the same beliefs; when journals 
mainly publish articles in the orthodox tradition, this 
aids the careers of the authors; and peer pressure 
usually comes from widespread acceptance of a belief 
system. 
When all or virtually all the methods of domination 
line up to support the same ideas, this can be called 
"unified domination." This is largely the case for 
orthodox cancer theory and therapy: for example, the 
dissident idea that surgery has not been proved to be 
effective for treatment of cancer (Benjamin, 1993) is 
not supported by any of the methods of domination. 
When some methods of domination support certain 
ideas but others are not relevant, this can be called 
"limited domination." This often applies to disputes 
within specialities that do not threaten the wider 
framework, such as over the conditions when surgery 
for prostate cancer is advisable. When some methods 
of domination support particular ideas but others 
support contrary ideas, this can be called "divided 
domination." For example, the idea that smoking 
causes lung cancer (or, more recently, that passive 
smoking causes lung cancer) is supported by most of 
the methods in Table 2, but the tobacco industry 
retains considerable financial resources, thus 
providing incentives for a few scientists to argue the 
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ever more discredited view that the smoking-cancer 
connection is not proved. 
To each of the methods of domination in Table 2 there 
is a corresponding method of marginalisation, as listed 
in Table 3. 
  
Table 3. Some methods of active 
marginalisation in medical research 
• State attacks 
• Deregistration 
• Restriction on entry 
• Career blockages 
• Lack of resources 
• Editorial rejection 
• Disincentives 
• Belief system 
• Peer pressure 
  
There is a considerable literature on suppression of 
challenging views in medicine and science illustrating 
these and other methods of marginalisation (Carter, 
1993; Deyo, Psaty, Simon, Wagner & Omenn, 1997; 
Fagin & Lavelle, 1996; Hess, 2000; Insight Team of 
The Sunday Times, 1979; Martin, 1999; Moran, 1998; 
Moss, 1996; Rosner & Markowitz, 1985; Walker, 1993). 
In the cancer field, there have been government raids 
on practitioners of alternative cancer therapies; some 
such practitioners have had their medical licenses 
revoked; students with dissident views have had 
trouble gaining degrees; challengers have had 
promotions denied and appointments blocked; 
research funding has been denied or withdrawn; 
research papers have been denied publication; 
recognition and rewards have been unavailable; 
standard belief systems have not had a space for 
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contrary views; and peers have ostracised dissidents. 
Linus Pauling was perhaps the most prominent of all 
cancer dissidents, having considerable initial 
advantages compared to most other challengers, 
including a huge reputation (for example having won 
two Nobel prizes), a full career behind him and hence 
few career risks, and connections with the scientific 
establishment. Nevertheless, he had to contend with 
lack of funding, denial of publication and fierce attacks 
on his credibility as a scientist (Richards, 1991). 
Note that Table 3 refers to methods of active 
marginalisation. This is when supporters of orthodoxy 
take overt steps against challengers. Far more common 
and difficult to deal with is what can be called passive 
marginalisation, for which neglect is the primary 
mechanism. A scientist may present an unorthodox 
idea and not be overtly penalised, just greeted with 
silence and lack of interest. An example is the 
nutritional prevention of kidney stones by taking 
magnesium and vitamin B6 (Gerras, Hanna, Feltman, 
Bingham, Golant & Moyer, 1976). Arguably, if the 
researchers who discovered this mode of prevention 
had instead developed a proprietary drug or an 
expensive apparatus for eliminating kidney stones 
once they are formed, their ideas would have rapidly 
become standard practice but, without support from 
any powerful interests, their cheap and easy approach 
has been largely ignored. 
The most common initial response to challengers to 
orthodoxy is passive marginalisation. If, nonetheless, a 
challenger gains some degree of attention such as 
through media coverage or patient interest, then active 
measures may be used. Finally, if the challenge is too 
strong to defeat by active measures, then cooption may 
work to minimise the damage to orthodoxy (Willis, 
1989). Arguably, the transformation of "alternative 
therapies" into "complementary therapies," used as 
minor supplements to conventional medical therapies, 
serves to maintain medical hegemony in a situation 
where many patients might otherwise opt entirely for 
alternatives. 
  
Strategies for dissidents and 
heretics 
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Faced with a hostile establishment and having limited 
resources, what should a dissenting medical researcher 
do? The analysis here implies that the prerequisite for 
effective action is a shedding of the idealistic belief that 
medicine operates purely on the basis of a communal 
quest for truth and health. Those who develop new 
ideas often imagine that all they need to do is to 
present solid arguments and evidence in order for their 
ideas to be taken seriously. Arguments and evidence 
are crucially important, to be sure, but are seldom 
adequate to make an establishment change. To have a 
chance of success, challengers need to recognise the 
central role of power and the way it is enmeshed with 
knowledge and practices. 
There are numerous ways for medical challengers to 
proceed. For example, they can try to develop an 
alternative ideology, publish in leading journals, 
publish in popular magazines, enlist patrons, join 
forces with other challengers, expose unsavoury 
establishment behaviour and make links with social 
movements (Hess, 2000; Martin, 1998; Wolpe, 1990, 
1994). To categorise these varied responses, it is useful 
to return to Figure 1 and to assign responses into one 
of the four quadrants. 
Challengers working within Quadrant I essentially aim 
to defeat the prevailing orthodoxy and themselves 
become bearers of the new orthodoxy, a strictly win-
lose process. The usual strategy is to play the same 
game as the orthodoxy but play it much better in order 
to overcome orthodoxy's inherent advantage. A typical 
plan is to carry out excellent research and get it 
published in top journals and to produce excellent 
clinical results and win support from other 
practitioners. It is advantageous to be seen to operate 
within the same epistemological universe as the 
orthodoxy, drawing on previously subsidiary themes 
and winning adherents by being seen to solve 
important problems while not being alien to the 
dominant discourse. This strategy sounds 
straightforward but can still be difficult to bring off. An 
example is the theory that many gastric and duodenal 
ulcers are caused by infection. The proponents of the 
new theory required many years of publication and 
clinical results before displacing the orthodox position 
(Kidd & Modlin, 1998). 
For challenges that are more sweeping or more 
epistemologically divergent from the orthodoxy, 
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strategies fitting into Quadrant II are more promising. 
Rather than try to become a new orthodoxy, the aim 
here is to compete for "market share" in a marketplace 
of diverse knowledges and practices. Examples here 
are alternative modalities to conventional treatment, 
such as chiropractic, acupuncture, reflexology and 
iridology. Instead of trying to compete on 
epistemological grounds, namely tackling orthodoxy 
on its own terms, it is useful to examine each of the 
methods by which orthodoxy maintains its position 
(Table 2) and to consider building alternatives. For 
example, it may be possible to win over elements 
within the state, such as members of a regulatory or 
policy agency who are favourably inclined to 
alternatives; to create alternative training institutes, 
such as chiropractic colleges; to win over a few 
independently-minded researchers or to raise money 
to fund research; to set up journals dedicated to the 
alternative; to elaborate a convincing belief system; 
and to modify peer pressure by promoting an ideology 
of tolerance for competition (rather than the 
intolerance that creates heresy). Combining several of 
these components into an overall programme is 
essentially a process of building a competing 
constituency (Dew, 2000b). 
Quadrant II strategies often can greatly benefit by 
"going public," namely taking claims directly to 
nonscientific audiences, such as through media stories, 
conferences and direct mail. Although this might be 
seen as deviating from what is seen as a "scientific" 
approach, actually orthodoxy uses the mass media and 
other public forums regularly. Since the orthodoxy 
normally has control over mainstream scientific 
journals, going direct to the public is often the best way 
to compete, and may even lay the groundwork for 
more serious treatment in the scientific literature. This 
point can be illustrated by the response to the theory 
that AIDS originated from contaminated polio vaccines 
used in Africa in the 1950s. In the 1980s, several 
submissions about the theory were rejected by 
scientific and medical journals. It was only after a 
popular treatment in the rock magazine Rolling Stone 
(Curtis, 1992) that leading journals discussed the 
theory and a panel of scientists was set up to assess it 
(Martin, 1993). However, little serious scientific 
investigation of the theory was undertaken until after 
publication of The river by writer Edward Hooper 
(2000), a book that generated so much attention that 
it could not be ignored by the AIDS establishment 
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(Weiss & Wain-Hobson, 2001). 
Another dimension to Quadrant II strategies is alliance 
with or creation of a social change constituency. For 
example, supporters of an approach to cancer based on 
nutritional prevention could find common cause with 
movements for organic farming, campaigns against 
cancer-causing chemicals such as bovine growth 
hormone or against polluting chemical plants, as well 
as more general affinities with environmentalists and 
public health campaigners. On the surface, to join a 
social movement and push for social change may be 
seen as "unscientific," but the orthodox medical 
establishment is just as much involved in such 
activities, such as via corporate funding for research 
and public relations campaigns. The establishment is 
also "political" in what it doesn't do, namely ignoring 
and thus tolerating promotion of junk food, industries 
producing dangerous by-products, hazardous work 
practices, urban planning that reduces incentives and 
opportunities for exercise, and many other unhealthy 
aspects of everyday life, not to mention the massive 
level of iatrogenic disease. Making ties with a social 
movement is perhaps the most powerful means of 
challenging orthodoxy through Quadrant II strategies. 
Competition has a much better chance of success when 
the challenger has not just an idea but also a practice, 
such as a treatment or a type of therapy, since this 
provides a direct outcome that can be used to 
demonstrate effectiveness, for example to patients or 
potential patrons. But when challenges are primarily in 
the realm of ideas, it can be harder to compete. 
Therefore it may be worth considering Quadrant III 
strategies, based on cooperative tolerance. Perhaps the 
best hope here is to find an open-minded scientist who 
is willing to provide sympathetic comment and, if 
appropriate, advocacy. For example, there are a few 
successful senior scientists who no longer feel obliged 
to compete for status and resources and thus have less 
of a commitment to orthodoxy. One key supporter of 
the theory that AIDS originated from contaminated 
polio vaccines was the late W. D. Hamilton, a highly 
prestigious biologist, who called for examination of the 
theory. Although the debate over the origin of AIDS 
has largely followed a conflict model, Hamilton can be 
seen as a figure more in the mould of cooperative 
tolerance. However, a strategy based entirely on 
Quadrant III premises is unlikely to have much chance 
of success, so strong is the conflict orientation in areas 
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of scientific disagreement. 
Finally there are strategies based on Quadrant IV, 
which presume cooperative search for a single 
scientific truth. It is here that many challengers devote 
great but futile efforts: they believe that by presenting 
their ideas honestly and openly to the scientific 
community, the response will be fair-minded scrutiny 
and, when warranted, acceptance. This happens so 
seldom that it might be fair to say that the cooperative 
search for scientific truth is a myth (Collins and Pinch, 
1998; Feyerabend, 1975; Mitroff, 1974). But it is a 
pervasive and powerful myth, which is why so many 
naive challengers persist in seeking an open-minded 
appraisal of their ideas. The usual outcome, especially 
when the challengers are outsiders, is total lack of 
interest, or occasionally active hostility, namely a 
Quadrant I response. 
Nevertheless, the myths associated with Quadrant IV 
can be used to advantage by sophisticated challengers, 
by exposing double standards and suppression. 
Although rejection of dissent and heresy is the 
standard mode of operation of science, the 
establishment normally trades on a belief that ideas 
are treated on their merits. In other words, a Quadrant 
I reality is disguised by a Quadrant IV ideology. If 
challengers can reveal the reality, for example by 
showing that defenders of orthodoxy use double 
standards, lie, unfairly block publications, harass 
opponents, destroy documents, withdraw grants or 
dismiss researchers, this can lend credibility to the 
challengers and attract support for fairer treatment. 
Many believers in orthodoxy believe in fair play; some 
of them, after being made aware of suppression of 
dissent, can be encouraged to genuinely cooperate in 
truth-seeking according to the scientific ideal, though 




An orthodoxy that draws on the full range of resources, 
namely which exercises unified domination, is 
incredibly difficult to challenge. Many challengers 
subscribe to the myth of scientific medicine as being 
based on open-minded examination of evidence, and 
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thus handicap themselves, since in practice they are 
ignored or attacked. In order to have a chance, they 
need to understand that science and medicine are 
systems of knowledge intertwined with power, and 
that if their alternative relies entirely on knowledge, 
without a power base, it is destined for oblivion. 
Success is least likely when orthodoxy is tackled head-
on, attempting to overturn it and become the new 
orthodoxy. The biomedical model is not about to be 
overthrown soon; at most some subsidiary features of 
the model may be reformulated. Far more promising 
are strategies based on competition, promoting belief 
in a plurality of approaches. But even in a marketplace 
of multiple alternatives, some approaches have great 
advantages over others, especially due to links to 
vested interests. Hence, for idealistic believers in a 
search for truth and social benefit, the vision of a 
cooperative striving for knowledge and human 
betterment remains appealing. Ironically, though, 
strategies based on this vision seem to have little 
chance of success compared to more cynical strategies 
based on cold calculation in a ruthless market. 
What can be said about the role of social science in this 
process? Much scholarly analysis is aimed primarily at 
understanding, with the primary audience being other 
scholars rather than participants in controversies. 
Within this domain, there are divergences and 
disagreements, expressed in different ways, between 
positivism and constructivism and between actor- and 
structure-oriented analyses. These and many related 
theoretical issues are vitally important intellectually, 
but how important are they for participants in 
struggles over medical knowledge? 
In assessing whether participants can actually use 
scholarly analyses and insights, the differences 
between positivism and constructivism or between 
structural analysis and group politics may not be 
nearly as important as they are for social scientists. 
More vital is the actual topic addressed in the social 
science research. Many studies remain entirely within 
the bounds of orthodoxy, giving no inkling that 
challenges even exist; others acknowledge the 
existence of challenges but implicitly justify orthodoxy 
by adopting standard assumptions about how medical 
science operates. 
Most useful to dissidents and heretics is serious 
Page 26 of 32Dissent and heresy in medicine: models, methods and strategies
5/17/2006http://www.uow.edu.au/arts/sts/bmartin/pubs/04ssm.html
attention. Their usual fate is to be made invisible and 
to be written out of history. When social scientists 
acknowledge the existence of a challenge - by reading 
documents, by talking to and corresponding with 
challengers, by recording their treatment - they can 
give them encouragement, even when the social 
scientists themselves are neutral or critical of the 
challengers. Thus in addition to the content of social 
science research, which can ignore, attack or support 
challengers, the process of the research is a 
contribution to the ongoing controversy. Even 
historical investigations have relevance to ongoing 
disputes, since to take dissent and heresy seriously in 
previous eras is to open the door to questioning of 
current orthodoxy. Thus, there is no way that social 
science research into dissent and heresy can possibly 
be neutral in any practical sense. The question is who 
is being supported and how. 
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